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Anti-Humanism as the Objectifying 
Logic of Politics：
A Pascalian Detour to Reread Althusser
大中一彌
ONAKA Kazuya ＊
The starting point of this study is a question that arises in reading Louis 
Althusser: what is the relationship between Althusserʼs philosophy and that of 
Blaise Pascal, the seventeenth century philosopher and scientist ? The question 
stems from the following passage in Althusserʼs article entitled "Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses":
"[W]e are indebted to Pascalʼs defensive ʻdialecticʼ for the wonderful 
formula which will enable us to invert the order of the notional schema of 
ideology. Pascal says, more or less: ʻKneel down, move your lips in prayer, 
and you will believeʼ. He thus scandalously inverts the order of things [...] 
A fortunate scandal that makes him stick with Jansenist defiance to a 
language that directly names the reality."1
"Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and you will believe" ─ In the 
context of this article, Althusserʼs phrase corresponds to a specific thesis, that of 
the materiality of ideology. According to Althusser, our spontaneous reasoning 
vis-à-vis belief remains idealistic. For instance, we often think that spiritual 
consciousness precedes prayer, unconsciously assuming that a prayer expresses 
consciousness. This order of things, in which a religious awareness precedes a 
physical act of prayer, reveals, in Althusserʼs terminology, an "ideological 
representation" of ideology, and is therefore idealistic2. But the materialist 
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analysis of ideology that Althusser advocates contradicts the primacy of the ideal 
over the material. Based on this analysis, the physical act of prayer does not 
emanate from the idealized existence of God. In fact, it is precisely by repeating 
a series of gestures with the body ─ kneeling and moving oneʼs lips, for example 
─ that the individual manages to imprint the idea of God on his or her  mind. 
Althusser sees the repeated gestures of prayer as a major explanatory principle of 
the existence of ideology. To emphasize that body gestures play a key role, 
Althusser does not hesitate to approach the Foucaldian argument of "the 
discipline of the body"3.
If we consider the "theory" of interpellation Althusser develops in the 
article, the question of repeated body gestures goes beyond the seventeenth 
century. The theory seeks to explain what secularized twentieth-century society 
produces.
In this study, we deal directly with the source from which Althusser found 
his inspiration, namely Pascalian philosophy. According to Althusser, Pascal was 
the only author whose texts he could read while in captivity during the Second 
World War4. This study examines three characteristics that Pascal and Althusser 
seem to share: their epistemological interests in the notion of the void; their 
anthropologic tendency that can be called anti-humanist; and their critical look 
at the legitimacy of the State. Letʼs examine each in turn.
1. The Epistemology of the Void
Void is one of the notions that clearly betray the presence of Pascalian 
thought in Althusser. It literally haunts Althusserʼs texts5. For example, Althusser 
describes his daily life at lʼÉcole normale supérieure in a 1961 letter: "This 
morning, (…) I was talking with the Deputy Director, a great Pascal specialist, 
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on the theoretical problems posed by the extract from the Treatise on Vacuum". 
This letter was addressed to his friend Franca Madonia whose dissertation was 
on Pascal6. In addition, in a manuscript from the 1980ʼs entitled "The 
undercurrent of materialism", Althusser returns to the notion of the void, for 
instance, in the following: "In the 17th century we see Pascal considering [the 
idea of the object of philosophy], and introducing the void as a philosophical 
object"7.
The extract from the Treatise on Vacuum to which Althusser makes reference 
in this sentence is among the Pascalian writings on physics. Starting in 1646, 
Pascal reproduces and develops the Torricelliʼs experiment. Essentially, Torricelliʼs 
experiment involves sealing one end of a long glass tube and completely filling it 
with mercury, then plugging the other end before turning the tube upside down 
and putting it in a basin of mercury. Then bottom plug is removed, opening the 
tube in the mercury. The mercury is seen to descend in the tube, creating a 
vacuum above it. In the academic milieu of that period, the question of knowing 
how to interpret this "apparent void" aroused great interest. As we know, Pascal 
takes a "vacuist" interpretation which is opposed to Aristotelian physics. 
According to the latter, nature abhors a vacuum. A void could not exist, and this 
"apparent void" had to be interpreted differently: for example, we could suppose 
that it was filled with some “subtle matter”, as the "plenists" affirmed. Pascal 
triggered a controversy against this plenist interpretation represented by the 
Jesuit Etienne Noël.
Pascalʼs argument in Preface to the Treatise on Vacuum is based on a pattern 
of opposition between the ancients and the moderns. In his view, the ancients 
have the right to say that nature abhors a vacuum, because they had no 
experiment to help them realize the erroneous nature of the hypothesis. That 
said, the authority of the ancients is not undeniable with regards to "subjects 
falling under the senses or under reasoning". Indeed, Pascal would like to 
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separate those domains where authority has the last word and those where 
reason prevails over authority. Letʼs briefly comment on this separation. On one 
hand, authority plays a primordial role in such subjects as history, law, and 
theology, where "one wishes only to know what others have written". With 
regard to theology, Pascal emphasizes that authority alone determines truth here. 
He says: " [The] principles [of theology] are above that of nature and reason, 
and that, the spirit of man being too weak to attain them by his own efforts, 
canʼt reach these intellectual heights if he is not supported by an omnipotent 
and supernatural strength". On the other hand, in domains where "all sciences 
[…] are subjected to experiment and to reasoning", Pascal observes that each 
generation brings new elements to knowledge that previous generations have 
acquired. In Preface to the Treatise on Vacuum, this vision of the accumulation of 
knowledge leads to a captivating image of progress, according to which human 
reason is created for an infinite process8.
"In a way, people today are in the same state as the ancient philosophers 
were, if they could have aged until the present, adding to their knowledge 
that which their studies would have enabled them to acquire with the 
advantage of so many centuries. From there comes, by particular 
prerogative, not only that each man advances from day to day in the 
sciences, but that all mankind together make continual progress as the 
universe ages, because the same thing happens in the succession of men as 
in the different ages of a particular individual. So that the entire series of 
men, during the course of centuries, should be considered as one man who 
subsists forever and learns continuously."9
In this way, Pascal derives a double consequence from the plenist formula 
that "nature abhors a vacuum". The first consequence is that Pascal contributed 
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to scientific progress by admitting to the existence of a vacuum in nature. The 
second consequence concerns the relationship between two categories of 
knowledge. Despite his belief in scientific progress, Pascal accepts the distinction 
between knowledge based on authority and knowledge based on the senses and 
reasoning. This finding is crucial insofar as this distinction itself derives not from 
natural science but theology. Shortly we will reflect on the question of which 
system of values Pascal uses to maintain the primacy of theology. But before 
that, we need to examine an anthropological presupposition of this distinction, 
that is to say, anti-humanism.
2. Anti-Humanism
Althusser defines humanism as an ideology and thus suggests that any 
humanist interpretation of Marx is idealist. It follows that Marxʼs theoretical 
anti-humanism establishes, according to Althusser, "the absolute (negative) 
precondition [condition de possibilité] of the (positive) knowledge of the human 
world itself, and of its practical transformation"10. Without going into a detailed 
analysis, we can characterize the function of the term "anti-humanism" in 
Althusser in two ways. On one hand, this term brings Althusser closer to other 
contemporary thinkers insofar as Kojève, Levi-Strauss, Derrida, and Foucault 
each evoked in their own way the "disappearance", "end" or "dissolution of 
man"11. On the other hand, Althusser opposes other Western Marxists whose 
hallmark is humanism. The "theoretical anti-humanism" of Marx is his battle 
cry for claiming that the scientific nature of Capital cannot be reduced in any 
way to the political posturing of the Communist Party (French or Soviet). But 
as Gérard Ferreyrolles pointed out, Pascal is often considered as an apolitical 
philosopher12. Therein, it seems, lies a paradoxical convergence between Pascal 
and Althusser. They indeed share an anthropology that radically questions the 
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legitimacy of the State. For Pascal, it is about emphasizing the temporal nature 
(and thus ephemeral nature) of honors; to Althusser, it is about challenging 
Gaullist authoritarianism and the Communist inability to produce a substantive 
criticism of Stalinism. In this study, we hereafter name this calling into question 
of existing institutional politics “the political” (le politique).
Henry Gouhier, who studied seventeenth century anti-humanism, gives a 
threefold definition of humanism. 
"1. Humanism signifies a certain sufficiency in man, albeit relative in 
Christian humanism; such would be the case if man, even if a sinner, can 
do something, only with the strengths that make him human, notably 
reason and will." 
"2. Which means: by only the strengths of his nature. It is no coincidence 
that the notion of nature has always been linked to humanism, at least 
until contemporary existentialisms in which the notion of history replaced 
it. The sufficiency that humanism recognizes is, in fact, that of nature [...] 
[I]t implies a relative goodness in nature." 
"3. This nature of man is unique in that it expresses itself in and by 
culture."13
This definition of humanism led Gouhier to suggest that anti-humanism – 
Christian anti-humanism, among others – be described with inverted 
propositions of the three above-mentioned characteristics. Namely: 1) Man is so 
weak that he will never attain self-sufficiency. For his own salvation, he needs 
the grace of God. 2) Human nature becomes bad after the Fall. 3) Culture 
highlights the misery of manʼs conditions. If this definition of anti-humanism is 
relevant, we can see a concrete example in Pascalʼs text on grace.
As Franz Borkenau noted in one of his works, it is important to take into 
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account "the affinity between him [Pascal] and the Calvinists"14. If we adopt the 
definition we have just given, both Pascal and the Calvinists seem to be anti-
humanists. But this definition we have made would not be appropriate for 
Pascal, because this affinity with the Calvinists would have made his ideological 
battles against the Jesuits within the Catholic Church difficult to sustain. So, to 
avoid any confusion, Pascal highlights the differences between his own 
theological understanding and that of the Calvinists: 
"[The] Calvinists differ horribly from us regarding the will of God in the 
creation of man, and we are conform in words to Godʼs absolute will for 
redemption, but differ in meaning, in that we believe that the decree of 
God comes after the anticipation of Adamʼs sin and is given to criminal 
men, while they claim that this decree is not only prior to but causes Adamʼs 
sin and is given to men who are still innocent."15
We can summarize the Pascalian argument in three stages. First, Pascal 
seeks to differentiate himself from the Calvinists. Second, he makes the 
theological distinction between before and after the Fall of Adam. Third, the 
"decree of God" does not come before the anticipation of "sin", with due respect 
to the Calvinists.
This argument puts Pascal in a particular position in the discursive 
configuration of the seventeenth century, which was described by Jean Dagens 
as "the century of St. Augustine."16 Indeed, he is fighting on two fronts. As for 
the first the distinction between before and after the Fall of Adam helps Pascal 
to affirm himself as Catholic by allowing him to emphasize the importance of 
free will. Pascal accuses the Calvinists of suppressing it with the doctrine of 
double predestination. As to the second, Pascal is dealing with internal enemies 
to Catholicism, the Molinists. Being themselves humanists, they could attack 
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Pascal in the following manner: if, as the Molinists would say, Pascal is anti-
humanist, what would free will then mean to him ? Pascal prepares to respond 
to this attack in Writings on Grace. Indeed, in it he clarifies once again his 
position on the distinction between before and after the Fall of Adam. But this 
time he does not do it to contradict the Calvinists but puts free will on the side 
of the innocent man before the Fall.
"Adamʼs free will, says St. Augustine, had nothing in itself to do with 
concupiscence, and this is not disputed by anyone: such that being entirely 
free and unconstrained, he could by this shortly sufficient relief [par ce 
secours prochainement suffisant] remain in justice, or move away from it, 
without being either forced or attracted by one or the other. But now, in 
the corruption that has infected the body and soul, concupiscence, having 
heightened, rendered man a slave to his delight, such that being a slave to 
sin, he cannot be delivered from this slavery except by a more powerful 
delight that makes him a slave to righteousness."17
According to Henri Gouhier, the opposition between Augustinianism and 
Molinism in the seventeenth century is not only about doctrinal disputes. In his 
words, in reality, every doctrine conceals "a psychological substructure"18. In 
Augustinism, grace manifests itself with a sense of freedom. The feeling of 
freedom is interpreted here as the absence of constraint in that grace frees man 
from the bondage of lust. It goes without saying that the choice of the elected 
remains a mystery to man. This Augustinism corresponds at least in part to the 
position of Pascal. In Molinism, meanwhile, grace always creates a sense of 
freedom but with a less restrictive theology regarding human behavior. Casuistry 
is there to clear the conscience with the most diverse behaviors. In the eyes of 
the friends of Port Royal, the Jesuits lose sight of the essence of belief in their 
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loosening of moral discipline in efforts to gain more followers. Pascal takes a 
more rigorous position. For him, grace is a source of help for man, who is too 
weak to break the yoke with concupiscence on his own. Grace guides man 
toward a prayer that would be the only way to reach salvation. Thus Pascal 
makes anti-humanism compatible with the theme of freedom.
Returning to Althusser, it is in this anti-humanist pattern of prayer that he 
meets Pascal. To grasp the nature of this pattern, let us refer to the famous 
passage from Pensées on Pascal's wager.
"But at least learn that your inability to believe, since reason brings you to 
this and you nevertheless cannot believe. Work, then, not to convince 
yourself with the increasing proof of God, but by diminishing your 
passions. You would like to find faith, and you do not know the way? You 
want to heal your unfaithfulness, and you are asking for the remedies to do 
so? Learn from those who have been bound like you and who now wager 
all of their good: they are people who know the path you would like to 
follow and are cured of a pain from which you too wish to be healed. 
Follow the way by which they began: it is by doing everything as if they 
believed, taking holy water, having masses said, etc. Even naturally, this will 
make you believe and you will be stupefied [Naturellement même cela vous 
fera croire et vous abêtira]."19
Philippe Sellier explains the use of the verb "abêtir" in the following way: 
"[This verb] does not mean to make oneself stupid, but to use what is common 
to man and animals, that is "the machine"[...] of the body, to encourage to 
custom "the automaton"[...] to belief"20. In other words, the root of the verb 
"abêtir" – the noun "bête" (beast) – suggests that the man is an "automaton" 
and equally a "spirit"21. If the repetition of external actions is essential to lead 
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man to belief, it is because this type of physical repetition makes the “beast” that 
we are accustomed to a deep conviction. Custom, which is nothing other than 
an institutionalized form of this repetition, effectively works the spirit of man. 
In this regard, Pascal gives the following formula: "[Custom] inclines the 
automaton, which leads the spirit even without thinking"22. In short, anti-
humanism is a chain connecting Althusser to Pascal, and consists of a triad of 
body, custom, and belief. Thus the anti-humanist anthropology implied by the 
use of the verb "abêtir" lays the foundation for an analysis of what we call the 
political. 
3. The Mystical Foundation of Authority 
Jacques Derrida evokes the notion of "the mystical foundation of 
authority" in his work entitled Force of Law23. He explicitly refers to a passage of 
Pensées24. In this work, Derrida addresses what we have termed the calling into 
question of existing institutional politics. According to Derrida, the law, which 
is at the heart of institutional politics, contains a dimension of violence not only 
in the moment of its foundation but also in the time of its conservation25. The 
key point for Derrida is the equivocity of justice that emanates from this link 
between law and political violence. He gives a formula that sums up this 
ambiguity by quoting Walter Benjamin: "there is [...] something rotten at the 
heart of the law"26.
We cannot amply comment on Derridaʼs text in this study. However, let us 
note that this ambiguity of temporal justice comes from Pascal's argument, 
which puts into perspective the conscience of those who take the established 
order as evident. It highlights a worldview whose engine is nothing other than 
the concupiscence of men. Pascal did not totally reject temporal justice, but 
limits the domains in which it exercises supremacy. Indeed, what Derrida 
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describes as "the assumption of [the] Christian pessimism” leads Pascal to take 
into account its limited legitimacy27. Temporal justice represents an authority 
whose system of values is ultimately inferior to the justice of spiritual salvation.
Letʼs refer to the Discourses on the Condition of the Great in which Pascal 
describes the ambiguity of temporal justice in the form of three stories addressed 
to a child of an aristocratic family.
The first discourse begins with an allegorical story.
"A man was thrown by a tempest onto an unknown island, the inhabitants 
of which were seeking their king, whom they had lost; and as he had 
accidentally some resemblance to him both in face and figure, he was 
mistaken for the king, and recognized as such by all the people. At first he 
knew not how to act: but he resolved, at length, to yield to his good 
fortune. He received, therefore, all the respect with which they honored 
him, and allowed himself to be treated as their king"28.
The moral of this passage is that the aristocratic child, to whom Pascal is 
speaking, must have a "double thought" [double pensée] as the character in this 
story. "Double thought" is necessary for a noble because it makes him lucid 
enough to survive his condition. Pascal refers to this thought as double in that it 
divides the existence of man into two parts: the outer appearance and the inner 
conviction. The character in this story, who owes his status of king to bodily 
resemblance, inevitably becomes aware of the gap between the inner life and the 
outer disguise. If we return to the aristocratic child to whom Pascal is speaking, 
the law – that is to say, the existing legal system – favors him by giving him a 
hereditary succession. But this first speech of Pascal is not intended to criticize 
the existing legal system. What is essential in his view is, in particular, the 
imaginary relationship that the prince maintains with the authority of laws.
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To this imaginary relationship we have with the law, the second discourse 
adds the distinction between two kinds of greatness. It distinguishes the 
greatness of the establishment, based on the rank of the family from which the 
individual comes, with the natural grandeur bestowed for example upon a 
talented geometrician. Pascal pulls out from this distinction the duties that 
correspond to each type of greatness. He also refuses there is any confusion here 
between outer appearance and inner conviction. Let us refer to one of Pascalʼs 
formulae that crystallizes what is owed to the greatness of establishment: "It is 
not necessary, because you are a Duke, that I think of highly of you; but it is 
necessary that I salute you"29. By formulating thus, Pascal points to a possible 
fault, that of confusing external greetings we offer to the greatness of 
establishment with the intimate feeling of respect that natural grandeur naturally 
inspires. 
To this separation between outer appearance and inner conviction, the 
third discourse adds an opposition, that between lust and love. On one hand, 
Pascal raises the notion of "the kingdom of charity" that reigns in God's order. 
It despises lust and seeks only the "goods of charity". On the other hand, 
temporal power bears no resemblance to the order of God: its power is to satisfy 
human greed. The best thing a ruler can do is be as generous as possible with his 
subjects. 
Truthfully speaking, there is not only morality in the rulerʼs incentive to 
generosity. It also corresponds to a utilitarian rationality of power. If politics 
functions according to concupiscence, why not regulate it through the 
redistribution of wealth ? Nevertheless, Pascal's argument does not seek to 
optimize such a cost-benefit relationship for the exercise of power. Instead, it 
purports to exceed the logic of utilitarian calculation. It is primarily a refusal to 
bury oneself inside this rationality. According to Pascal, a ruler is not immune 
from perdition, even if he is generous with his subjects. Admittedly, as Pascal 
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says, a generous ruler would be more "honest" than "people who are damned 
[...] by greed, by brutality, by debauchery, by violence, by outbursts, by 
blasphemies". Yet Pascal suggests that acting as a "gentleman" [honnête homme] 
does not save the ruler from the death of the soul. Ultimately, temporal justice 
belongs to the realm of concupiscence30. 
The extract from Pensées known by the name of "the mystical foundation 
of authority" shares the theme of the ambiguity of temporal justice. The 
Discourses on the Condition of the Great already put the authority of law in 
perspective with the opposition between love and concupiscence. Now, it is 
through geographic boundaries that Pascal puts it into perspective.
"[...] we see nothing just or unjust that does not change in quality when 
the climate changes. Raising the bar by three degrees overturns all 
jurisprudence. A meridian decides the truth. After a few years of possession, 
the fundamental laws change. The law has its epochs, the entry of Saturn 
in Leo marks the origin of a crime for us. Pleasant justice that is bounded 
by a river ! Truth is on this side of the Pyrenees, error is beyond."31
Just as with Montaigne, it is in his relationship with the war, in particular, 
that Pascal calls into question the authority of law. A war almost always occurs 
at geographic borders. But the justice that temporal power produces in a given 
territory is unable to resolve conflicts between monarchs. 
Indeed, the authority of law, which presupposes the supremacy of a 
temporal power over a given territory, is powerless in conflicts where the issue is 
precisely this supremacy itself. To this relativism, philosophy usually opposes 
natural laws. This is what Pascal does. He calls the natural laws "common to all 
countries" and says that without a doubt they exist. 
But, men are corrupt after the Fall. After having confirmed the universality 
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of natural law, Pascal immediately adds a proposition that makes one think of 
the anti-humanism which we mentioned earlier. He says "this good reason once 
corrupted has corrupted all". In our view, this addition means that the natural 
laws are in fact rejected as a basis for politics. Pascal believes that the surest 
foundation of the law is "current custom".
"[...] one says that the essence of justice is the authority of the legislator, 
another that it is the convenience of the sovereign, another that is current 
custom. And it is the most sure. Nothing, according to reason alone, is just 
in itself, all changes with time. Custom creates equity, for the simple reason 
that it is accepted. It is the mystical foundation of its authority."32
Pascal's position is thus clear. It is custom that lays the basis for the 
authority of law. But this Pascalian acceptance of relativism allows for an 
equivocal reading. 
In one sense, by identifying custom as a basis of authority, Pascal is brought 
closer to conventionalism. We define conventionalism as a doctrine according to 
which the legitimacy of an institution does not come from the conclusion 
reached by a rational examination of the laws, but through conformity with the 
custom historically rooted in a given society. Indeed, conventionalism has a 
feature in common with the anti-humanist notion of prayer, in that it does not 
presuppose any ideal principle that would transcend the custom. 
In another sense, the function of custom changes character when Pascal 
analyzes the issue of the opinion of the people. In his view, the people take the 
ancientness of laws and custom "as evidence of their truth"33. Still, according to 
Pascal, the semi-learned criticize the opinion of the people for taking into 
account only external signs when it comes to judging the merit of a man or the 
fairness of a law. The semi-learned thus despise of the opinion of the people and 
Hosei University Repository
87
16異文化16異文化
triumph by showing what they call "the madness of the world," that is to say the 
myopia of the common people34. Besides the people and the semi-learned, Pascal 
introduces a third and final category, the learned. The learned deem the opinion 
of the people to be sound. They approve of it then, but not quite for the same 
reason as the people. If we take again a formula from Pensées, it is because of a 
"hidden thought" [pensée de derrière] that the learned endorse the opinion of the 
people35. Let us briefly try to describe this "hidden thought". For Pascal, the 
greatest evil is civil war. To prevent it, the people must obey laws and customs. If 
they do this, it is only because they believe that the laws and customs represent 
justice. But the semi-learned would say that the laws and customs do not always 
represent the truth. In their eyes, the opinion of the people is based solely on 
"authority only, without truth" of the laws and customs36. This discourse of the 
semi-learned, which would characterize the opinion of the people as 
authoritarian and obscurantist, has a flaw : it does not take into account the 
practical consequence engendered by the act of stating a negative judgment 
about it. Indeed, the people obey as they believe that the truth remains in laws 
and customs. Pascal is concerned that this confidence can collapse among 
common people. He says, "[the people] are susceptible to revolt as soon as they 
are shown that [the laws and customs] are worthless"37. This is why the discourse 
of the semi-learned criticizing the opinion of the people must be challenged38. 
Otherwise, the laws and customs that make up the "mystical foundation" of the 
authority would lose legitimacy, and would degrade into what Pascal calls the 
"grimace". An extract from Pensées anticipates a scene of insurgency in which 
the people attack the authority of law : "When force attacks the grimace [...] a 
simple soldier takes the square cap of the presiding judge and spins it out of the 
window"39. 
However, such a "hidden thought" cannot be reduced to an anti-
revolutionary utilitarianism of nobility. Indeed, Pascal's attitude to the opinion 
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of the people is itself twofold. Politically, Pascal finds healthy the obedience to 
authority that ensues. On a purely rational level, however, the opinion of the 
people is futile. In short, a healthy opinion is not necessarily a true opinion. 
Pascal said, "It is still true that the people are vain"40.We assume that this 
proposition applies only to the realm of reason, not the realm of politics. The 
epistemological dichotomy we have discussed in relation to the concept of 
vacuum seems to approve this disjunction. 
Let us conclude by commenting on this disjunction between politics and 
reason. Here, Pascal's expression "the madness of the world" we mentioned 
above is interesting. Indeed, interpreted literally, it could signify something 
other than the irrationality of the opinion of the people, and could mean instead 
the perversion of the world as it is reflected in the eyes of the semi-learned. 
Pascal characterizes this perversion of the world as a permanent gap between 
politics and reason. As a good philosopher, he summons Plato and Aristotle as 
representatives of reason. In an extract from Pensées, he explains why Plato and 
Aristotle wrote their political treaties : "If they wrote about politics, it was as if 
to settle a lunatic asylum". Added to this is that Pascal considers the writing of 
these treaties to be "the least philosophical and serious part of their lives". In 
short, they would have written them for divertissement. But these treaties have a 
very solemn air. Letʼs refer to a passage in which Pascal explains why they are so.
"[If Plato and Aristotle] pretended [to] talk about [politics] as a great thing, 
it is because they knew that the madmen to whom they were speaking 
thought themselves kings and emperors. They entered into their principles 
to moderate their folly with the least trouble possible."41
The problem is that it seems neither Dionysius I of Syracuse for Plato nor 
Alexander of Macedonia for Aristotle suffered from psychological problems 
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requiring hospitalization. On the contrary, history teaches us that Dionysius I 
and Alexander were sufficiently intelligent to expand their influence. They were 
therefore not sick people who falsely considered themselves monarchs ; as such, 
they were true rulers. So why does Pascal speak of them as "mad"? It could be 
that he believes that a gap between reason and political authority is inevitable. 
Among those with names such as "kings and emperors", the disjunction between 
reason and political authority reaches a level where the gap between words and 
deeds becomes "crazy." In another extract from Pensées, Pascal still alludes to 
Plato. He says : "This is why the wisest of legislators said that for the good of 
man, you often have to trick them"42. This is the Platonic theme of noble lies. 
In fact, Althusser opposes Pascal to Plato in order to develop his thesis on 
the "eternity" of ideology. In the eyes of Althusser, the Platonic theme of noble 
lies is equivalent to the analysis of ideologues of the eighteenth to nineteenth 
centuries (e. g. Cabanis, Destutt de Tracy)43. In their view, ideology is seen as a 
means of manipulation created by the ruling class in order to deceive the 
exploited class44. But Althusser takes as materialist a problematic according to 
which "Human societies secrete ideology as the very element and atmosphere 
indispensable to their historical respiration and life" (including classless 
societies)45. Pascalʼs presence in Althusser seems to correspond to this "eternal" 
element of ideology. The "theory" of interpellation, which illustrates the 
presence of this element in Althusser, gives "the Christ of Pascal" as the Subject 
(written with a capital letter)  who interpellates individuals as subjects46. Then 
the latter will recognize in themselves the phenomenon of a split, such as 
"double thought" or "hidden thought". Finally, this split is considered to be a 
precondition for ideological and political struggles. Just as Pensées anticipates a 
scene of popular insurgency against the "grimace", Althusser notes that the 
"ideological sub-formations ʻproducedʼ in the apparatuses […] ʻmake the gears 
grate and grindʼ"47. He finds out, in these noises, the potentiality for revolution 
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to come48. Until it comes, Althusserʼs "eternal" anti-humanism continues to 
struggle against an ideological core, namely, the idea of man as a constituent 
subject. The theoretical anti-humanism allows individuals to objectively 
represent to themselves our capitalist societies, which evoke in several respects 
what the author of Pensées has called the realm of concupiscence.
⁂  The following is modified and translated into English from my communication at the 
Materialist Ontologies and Politics conference held at the University of Poitiers on 
December 3, 2010, organized by Jean-Claude Bourdin and Charles T. Wolfe. This work 
is supported by JSPS KAKENHI (Grant No. 25380171).
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